Military Justice

Bill C-11

An Act to amend the National Defense Act and other Acts
Short title: Military Justice System Modernization Act

Bill type:  House Government Bill

Bill C-11 Summary

Military Justice System Modernization Act

(Reported to House February 9, 2026)

This Bill reforms Canada's military justice system in response to independent reviews addressing sexual misconduct and systemic issues.

Key Reforms

Independence Enhancements:

Modifies appointment processes for Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (renamed Provost Marshal General), Director of Military Prosecutions and Director of Defense Counsel Services to strengthen independence

Appointments must occur within 120 days of vacancy Directors serve 7-year non-renewable terms, removable only for cause with House of Commons resolution support

Affirms Judge Advocate General must respect independence of military justice authorities

Sexual Offense Jurisdiction Transfer:

Removes court martial jurisdiction over sexual offences committed in Canada (sexual assault, harassment, exploitation, trafficking, etc.)

Transfers these cases to civilian courts

Victim choice provision:

Victims can choose whether accused is tried by court martial or civilian court

Provision sunsets after 4 years unless Parliament extends it

Military can still secure evidence and make arrests before civilian authorities arrive

Other Changes:

Expands eligibility for military judge appointments (includes former members)

Military judges released from Canadian Forces upon appointment

Removes military judges from summary hearing system

Victim and accused liaison officers can be requested

Requires trauma-informed approach for sexual offence investigations

Harmonizes sex offender registration with Criminal Code amendments

Expands who can file interference complaints (victims, affected persons)

Requires plan for Inspector General for Sexual Misconduct office within 6 months

Power/Money/Rights Summary:

Power shifts: Independent military justice officials (Provost Marshal General, Directors of Prosecutions and Defense Counsel) gain 7-year protected terms removable only by House of Commons resolution, reducing command influence. Judge Advocate General (JAG) must now respect their independence—ending previous oversight/interference in charging and trial decisions. Civilian courts gain jurisdiction over military sexual offences committed in Canada, removing military chain-of-command control. Victims gain power to choose court martial or civilian trial for 4 years. Inspector General for Sexual Misconduct gains statutory mandate within 6 months.

Career betrayal and institutional failure: Service members who volunteered to serve their country were forced to abandon newly-started military careers due to sexual misconduct the military failed to address. Varying degrees of harassment drove them out—some during training, some after field assignment—all believing the system would protect them. It didn't. The retention crisis of service members leaving early in their service is measurable proof of systemic failure. The military recruited service members into careers while failing to protect them from sexual misconduct, forcing them to abandon wages, benefits, pensions, and advancement. This is the ultimate betrayal: you wanted to serve your country, your country failed to protect you, you had to leave, and no one was held accountable.

Weaponized justice concerns: Military justice has been used to remove dissenting officers by prosecuting decades-old allegations—including cases where officers questioned COVID vaccine mandates and were court-martialed for 30-year-old conduct only after challenging current policy. This raises questions about whether military justice can be weaponized as a political tool, and whether transferring cases to civilian courts protects accused from command manipulation or removes accountability mechanisms. Not all command officers are corrupt—some fear career loss if they don't comply with institutional pressure, some follow questionable orders, and some go rogue/whistleblow and face retaliation. Some officers transition to government positions to secure military funding, creating a revolving door between military command and political power.

Money flows: Costs shift to civilian court systems for prosecuting military sexual offences. Military budget funds new liaison officers, trauma-informed training, and Inspector General office. Taxpayers fund dual-system infrastructure during 4-year victim-choice period. Potential compensation liability for service members forced to abandon careers due to unprosecuted misconduct could be massive if systemic scale is acknowledged.

Rights impact: Victims gain choice over trial venue and access to liaison officers, increasing autonomy in justice process. Critically, transferring cases to civilian criminal courts gives victims the voice they were denied in military courts, where prosecution rates were extremely low and the "old boy club" culture protected perpetrators. Service members who volunteered to serve were silenced by the institution meant to protect them—moving cases to civilian courts breaks that protective barrier around abusers. Accused military members lose right to military-only trial for sexual offences, facing civilian courts with different procedures and potentially harsher sentences—but also gain protection from politically-motivated prosecutions and command manipulation. Military judges gain independence from chain of command but lose summary hearing authority. Service members gain trauma-informed investigation protections but lose internal resolution options. Recruits lack informed consent about sexual misconduct rates before enlisting.